Ankara, Turkey – Turkey’ s determination to protect its legal rights and interests in the Main Land and the Blue Homeland in accordance with the international law has rootly changed the geopolitical balance in the region. The escalation of tension with Greece, backed by imperialist-colonialist France, and EU, in the Mediterranean and Aegean poses obvious dangers, which however potential in comparison to future risks. What are the main geopolitical trends shaping tomorrow’s conditions in the region?

First, the gradual withdrawal of the United States will likely continue in a far more orderly manner in the next years. A domestic US majority opposes interventions in the Middle East, and growing US energy self-sufficiency minimizes dependence on the region’s oil. However, curbing the influence of China, Russia, and terrorism will remain the strategic priority of the US in the global politics. For this reason, the US will seek to keep Turkey in the alliance showing respect for its regional security and its credibility.

Second, the situation in the Εastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is more likely to worsen than to improve in the future. The US and EU open support will feed the expansion of the Israeli agression in the Middle East. Indeed, the annexation of Palestinian territories are already in place with open encouragement of the imperial powers in the region.

Apart Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) of Southern Cyprus , Israel has been persistently provocating and directing the Middle Eastern vicious regimes such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia against Turkey. The expanding political influence of Turkey in Middle East, Mediterranean, and Africa has also mobilized imperialist-colonialist France against Turkey.

Third, fossil fuel hydrocarbon markets are on a relative decline, for reasons including US energy self-sufficiency and the European Union’s shift to green energy. Any deep deposits in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean are likely to face an adverse market environment; the window for their extraction and development is closing. The decline of oil could destabilize most vicious countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, pillars of the anti-Turkey alliance.

Fourth, Turkey itself is a country of rapid population growth relative to Europe and Greece; its middle class will grow, and its economic and military power will expand in the future. The peaceful political nationalism is now endemic in Turkish society, and likely to survive for driving Turkey’s influential political power in the future.

Despite these negative trends, a main positive prospect concerns the US, which remains Turkey’s steady ally and partner in the long run. Developments are being driven by the EU’s growing geopolitical obligations in neighboring regions, either to fill the vacuum left by the US or to stem the growing influence of actors such as Turkey and Russia. However, Russia so far has been aiming to divide NATO and European political forces.

Under such circumstances, the US remains Turkey’s most dependable ally in the region. Despite the differences between Germany and France, the EU is moving toward a rules-based partnership with Turkey, based on a combination of incentives and sanctions. It needs a working relationship with Turkey: because trade interdependency is strong, but also because Turkey is a necessary partner of the EU on energy, security and migratory flows. The French logic of agressive containing Turkey will be combined with the German logic of balancing engagement of Turkey.

Therefore, the EU will not be drawn into a confrontation with Turkey, not least because that would exacerbate anti-European sentiment in Turkish society, further fueling Turkey’s nationalist reaction. Although Turkey has been repeatedly calling for an open unconditional peaceful dialogue with Greece, EU will try to use all the levers to pressure financially Turkey into constructive dialogue with Greece.

When Greece withdraws the repeated rhetorical provocations, and aggressions, a window of opportunity for dialogue will open, with the potential to resolve bilateral disputes. The geopolitical window will not remain open for long in Eastern Mediterranean and Eastern Aegean. Conclusively, any postponement under the “doctrine of inaction” will work directly against Turkey’s national interests in the region.